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What is different this time? That is my topic
this evening.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Robert H. Rasche, senior vice president
and director of research, provided special assis-
tance. I retain full responsibility for errors.
SOME ENERGY FACTS
While petroleum price developments are
most prominent in everyone’s mind, they reflect
only part of the energy story. About 40 percent of
energy consumption in the U.S. economy is
derived from petroleum-based products. Coal
and coal derivatives are the source of about 23
percent of U.S. energy consumption; natural gas
about 22 percent and the nuclear and renewable
energy sources the remaining 15 percent. These
sources of energy consumption have been remark-
ably stable over the past 20 years, as shown in
Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the prices of three pri-
mary energy sources as index numbers with
1982-84 = 1.0. Figure 3 shows the prices of two
consumer energy products, electricity and gaso-
line, again as index numbers relative to the same
base period. These figures are drawn from annual
average data and therefore do not show price
volatility over the course of a year.
From these figures, you can see that price
trends for the various energy sources have been
broadly similar, except for recent years. The sta-
bility of the fraction of energy consumption from
I
am sure that over the past several years
everyone in the audience has experienced
“sticker shock” as the price of a gallon of
gasoline at your weekly fill-up rose from
around $1.40 to $2 and now to around $3. More
abstractly, you have read newspaper reports that
the price of a barrel of crude oil rose from about
$25 per barrel to $50 and, most recently, to the
neighborhood of $75.
Although economists are a bit nervous about
this situation, the U.S. economy has performed
well despite the oil price increases. We are nerv-
ous because those of us of a certain age remember
well how different the situation was in the 1970s.
As oil prices rose in 1973-74, the overall rate of
inflation reached 11 percent over the four quarters
of 1974, as measured by the price index for per-
sonal consumption expenditures. The PCE price
index, by the way, is somewhat broader than the
more familiar Consumer Price Index. The reces-
sion that occurred at the same time took the
unemployment rate to 9 percent in May 1975.
Then it happened again. With large oil price
increases in 1978-79, the PCE price index rose
by 10 percent over the four quarters of 1979. There
was a recession in 1980 and a more serious reces-
sion during 1981-82 that took the unemployment
rate to almost 11 percent at the end of 1982.
Oil price increases over the past several years
are, in percentage terms, roughly comparable to
the 1970s’ episodes, but overall inflation has
remained relatively contained. Unemployment
has drifted down and is currently about 41/2 per-
cent. This unemployment rate is at or perhaps
even a bit below estimates of the full-employment
rate of unemployment.different sources is not surprising given that, until
recently, price trends for these energy goods were
broadly similar which means that the relative
prices of energy sources haven’t changed much.
Indeed, from the mid-1980s through about 2002,
the relative prices of these energy sources were
almost constant. From 1980 to 2000, primary
energy prices generally trended slightly down-
ward, while the prices of the two retail energy
products shown in Figure 3 were roughly constant.
It is only in the past few years that there has
been a major change in the relative prices. Crude
oil prices have risen most rapidly in the recent
past, roughly doubling since 2000. Natural gas
prices and retail gasoline prices have gone up
about 70 percent over the same period. However,
the price of coal has gone up only 40 percent, and
the price of electricity only 30 percent. The latter
reflects the large percentage of coal-fired genera-
tion capacity and regulation of retail electricity
prices that slows the adjustment of prices at the
retail level to increases in input costs.
The positive trend in crude oil and natural
gas prices started well before the disruptions to
production with the 2005 hurricanes in the Gulf
of Mexico, domestic refinery outages and the
heightened geopolitical risk in the Middle East.
These supply-side events caused price spikes in
the last couple of years, but the pattern of price
movements since Y2K reflects strong world
demand for energy as well as supply shocks. Given
relatively low short-run elasticities of demand
for the various sources of energy, the fractions of
total energy consumption have not yet responded
strongly to the recent price increases. If these
relative price changes persist, we should expect
the fraction of energy consumption from coal to
rise and the fraction from petroleum and natural
gas to fall.
The recent increases in nominal energy prices
notwithstanding, energy in the United States
remains quite inexpensive. This fact, surprising
as it may seem, can be seen in Figures 4 and 5
where the real prices of various energy products
are shown. By “real price” we mean the price of
a good in terms of other goods. Figures 4 and 5
show the nominal prices from Figures 2 and 3
divided by the personal consumption price index
for all items except food and energy (the so-called
“core PCE price index”) on a base of 1982-84 = 1.0.
The real price of natural gas reached a high for
the past 30 years in 2005 with the hurricane-
related production disruptions. In 2006, real
natural gas prices declined, but remained higher
than anytime in the 1973-2004 period. The real
price of crude trended down from 1982 through
1998, but increases beginning in 1999 brought the
real price to just 9 percent above 1982-84 levels
and roughly 20 percent below its 1981 peak.
In contrast, the real price of coal fell steadily
from 1976 to 2003 and has since risen only
slightly. In 2006, the real price of coal was less
than half of its 1982-84 value. The real retail price
of gasoline has increased continuously since
2003, but in 2006 exceeded the average price of
1982-84 by only 12 percent. The relative price in
2006 is roughly 10 percent below its historical
high reached in 1981. The real price of electricity
fell by about 35 percent from the early 1980s until
1999, leveled off, and has increased about 12 per-
cent since 2003. Nevertheless electricity remains
23 percent cheaper in real terms than it was on
average during 1982-84.
As painful as recent energy price increases
have been, this historical perspective helps us
to understand why the economy has been able to
absorb the price increases with little effect on
the aggregate economy. Perhaps the most direct
way to understand the impact of energy prices
on consumers is to examine the fraction of house-
hold budgets devoted to energy.
After 1981, the share of consumer expendi-
tures on energy out of nominal disposable per-
sonal income trended downward, from a high of
over 8 percent to about 4.1 percent in 1998 (see
Figure 6). Disposable personal income, by the
way, is essentially all household income includ-
ing transfers such as Social Security benefits less
direct taxes, which are mostly income taxes. Real
disposable personal income is the nominal or
dollar amount adjusted for changes in the general
price level.
With the increase in energy prices documented
in Figures 2 and 3, the energy share of disposable
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s t c u d o r P m u e l o r t e P l a o C s a G l a r u t a N e l b a w e n e R d n a r a e l c u N
Figure 1
Sources of U.S. Energy Consumption
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.















































































l i O e d u r C l a o C s a G l a r u t a N
Figure 2
Nominal Energy Prices
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
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y t i c i r t c e l E e n i l o s a G l i a t e R
Figure 3
Nominal Energy Prices
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

















































































l i O e d u r C l a o C s a G l a r u t a N
Figure 4
Real Energy Prices
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.Energy and the U.S. Macro Economy
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y t i c i r t c e l E e n i l o s a G l i a t e R
Figure 5
Real Energy Prices
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.
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n o i t c a r F e r u t i d n e p x E y g r e n E
Figure 6
Share of Energy Consumption in Nominal Disposable Personal Income
SOURCE: Computed from Bureau of Economic Analysis data.personal income rose from 4.1 percent in 1998 to
almost 5.8 percent in 2006. This increase simply
returns the share to about its 1985 level. It is
important to recognize, however, that the increase
in energy prices, though of limited impact in the
aggregate, has forced difficult choices on lower-
income households for whom the burden has
been much higher as a proportion of income.
The recent price increases are having the
expected negative impact on the quantity of energy
consumed, relative to total goods and services
consumed, but the total amount spent on energy
has nevertheless increased. The increase in the
energy share of nominal disposable personal
income reflects the inelastic short-run demand
for energy by consumers. Put another way, as
energy prices have surged, the quantity of energy
consumed has grown more slowly than real dis-
posable personal income but not slowly enough,
given the price increases, to prevent the amount
spent on energy from rising significantly.
To understand the impact of energy price
increases on households, we need to compare
what actually happened with a baseline scenario.
We’ll compare 2006 with 2002. A reasonable
baseline scenario assumes that the relative price
of energy is unchanged—that is, that the nominal
price of energy rises by the same percentage as
consumer prices excluding energy actually rose.
Second, let’s assume that the quantity of energy
consumed had increased by the same percentage
that real disposable personal income actually
rose. With these assumptions, the percentage of
disposable income spent on energy in 2006 would
have matched the percentage in 2002, which was
4.2 percent.
With these assumptions, in 2006 the baseline
spending on energy in nominal dollars would
have been $400 billion. Actual spending on
energy, at $550 billion, was $150 billion higher.
Had the quantity of energy consumed increased
between 2002 and 2006 at the same rate real dis-
posable personal income increased, spending
on energy in 2006 would have been higher by
another $47 billion. Thus, between 2002 and 2006,
consumers’ responses to energy price increases
held down the increase in the quantity of energy
consumed to 1.4 percent compared to the increase
in real disposable personal income of 10 percent.
I would not claim that an extra $150 billion
increase in consumer spending on energy is a
small number. However, we need to put that num-
ber in perspective. The extra spending on energy
in 2006 was 1.6 percent of disposable personal
income. By way of comparison, consider some
other spending increases between 2002 and 2006.
As a percentage of disposable personal income,
consumer spending on furniture and household
equipment rose from 4.1 to 4.2, spending on recre-
ation from 3.8 to 4.0, spending on food from 12.8
to 13.4 and spending on medical care from 15.4
to 16.7. Indeed, between 2002 and 2006, spending
on alcoholic beverages rose by $40 billion, from
1.5 to 1.6 percent of disposable personal income.
From these numbers, I conclude that the
impact of energy price increases on consumers
has been far less than headlines would lead
readers and TV viewers to believe. I suppose we
could argue that medical care and energy spend-
ing increases are driving people to drink, but, in
the process, U.S. consumers have been able to
increase their spending share on furniture and
recreation as well. It must be that consumers are
not so hard-pressed after all, except for those in
the lowest income groups. The impact has been
real, but the magnitude small enough that price
increases have not disrupted the normal processes
of economic growth.
EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICE
INCREASES ON THE ECONOMY
I’ve emphasized that energy price increases
have not had serious adverse impacts on the
U.S. economy. The effects on consumers as a
whole have not been all that large; the economy
has grown nicely since 2002, and the labor mar-
ket is currently very close to full employment.
But economists do have concerns, in good part
because of lingering bad memories of previous
periods of sharply rising energy prices.
The energy shocks of 1973 and 1979-80 were
principally supply-side disturbances to energy
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6markets: the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian
hostage crisis, compounded by the presence of
price controls in the United States. The impact
of those shocks is certainly burned into my mem-
ory, and likely into the memory of everyone who
lived through experiences of long lines at gasoline
stations that sometimes actually ran out of fuel;
mandatory reductions in thermostat settings at
business and government offices; and year-round
daylight saving time. In addition, both of these
shocks were followed by recession.
Over the past four years, we have seen none
of the macroeconomic complications of the early
energy price shocks. An important part of the
difference this time is that the recent trend in
relative energy prices has been driven by rapidly
increasing world demand for energy. Figure 7
shows energy consumption in four major eco-
nomic areas: the United States, Europe, Japan
and China plus India.1 The latest data available
are for 2004. Between 2002 and 2004, primary
world energy consumption increased 9 percent.
However, energy consumption in the United
States grew only 2.5 percent, in the EU-15 4.2
percent and in Japan 2.9 percent. In contrast, dur-
ing this period primary energy consumption in
China and India is estimated to have grown 33.0
percent. The increase in primary energy consump-
tion in the latter two countries is estimated at 51
percent of the total world increase in energy con-
sumption. Clearly, rapid development of populous
emerging market economies is the major source
of large increases in world energy demand. This
shift in the world demand for energy is the under-
lying source of the price trends that are docu-
mented in Figures 2 to 5.
However, energy markets work! The real price
increases have provoked a response in production
sufficient to accommodate the higher demand.
World production of primary energy increased
9.1 percent from 2002 through 2004. The price
mechanism in world energy markets is alive and
functioning well to increase total production
and to allocate available supply among the exist-
ing and emerging sources of demand.
Faced with these higher energy prices, con-
sumers and businesses in the United States have
reacted in the manner predicted by basic economic
analysis. As I discussed above, consumers have
reduced their consumption of more expensive
energy relative to total consumption expenditures.
Yet they have been able to maintain strong over-
all demand for consumption goods. Real personal
consumption expenditures in the United States
grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent from
2002 through 2006, and this strong growth in
consumer demand has made a major contribution
to the continued growth of our economy five years
into an economic expansion.
The business sector of the U.S. economy has
also reacted to higher energy prices over time.
Energy use per dollar of real GDP is shown in
Figure 8. Energy use shows a consistent negative
trend reaching a value in 2006 of 8.75 or only 48.6
percent of the 1970 value of 17.99. This downward
trend is the result of efficiency improvements
and structural changes in the economy that have
shifted production toward less energy intensive
industries. In Figure 9 it can be seen that in 2006
consumption of energy in the industrial sector—
the sector consuming the most energy in our
economy—is at roughly the same absolute level
as it was in the early 1970s. Industrial firms have
maintained this level of energy consumption even
though industrial production in manufacturing
in 2006 is three times larger than it was in 1970.
The transportation sector is the second largest
consumer of energy in the U.S. economy. Energy
usage in this sector has trended upward steadily.
The increase is driven by the growing number of
vehicle miles and the failure of improvements in
the average fuel efficiency of the fleet of domestic
motor vehicles to offset increases in total vehicle
miles. Figure 10 shows fuel efficiency of various
types of vehicles in the United States. Fuel effi-
ciency of our truck fleet has been relatively con-
stant since the late 1960s. Although substantial
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1 Europe is defined here as the EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
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s e t a t S d e t i n U 5 1 - U E n a p a J a i d n I d n a a n i h C
Figure 7
World Energy Consumption
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Energy Consumption per Dollar of Real GDPEnergy and the U.S. Macro Economy
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l a i r t s u d n I n o i t a t r o p s n a r T l a i t n e d i s e R l a i c r e m m o C
Figure 9
Energy Consumption by End-Use Sector
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Figure 10
Motor Vehicle Fuel Ratesincreases in the fuel efficiency of passenger cars
have been realized since the mid-1970s, the fuel
efficiency of vans, pickup trucks and SUVs basi-
cally flattened out or declined a bit after the
early 1990s. Overall fuel efficiency has tended to
decline as consumers increased the share of light
trucks and reduced the share of passenger cars.
Very recently, it appears that households are
adjusting their preferences for types of vehicles
in light of the increased real price of gasoline.
The percentage of light trucks, which includes
vans and SUVs, in total light vehicle sales peaked
in late 2004 at 57.5 percent and by mid-2007 had
declined to 51 percent.
Residential consumption of energy leveled
off from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s
but has trended up for the past 20 years. However,
relative to the stock of housing in the United
States, residential energy consumption has been
essentially flat since the early 1980s.
Business activity is also reflecting the upward
trend in relative energy prices. Domestic drilling
for oil and natural gas, as measured by rigs in
operation (Figure 11) has increased in the past
several years, after many years of a flat level of
activity. Part of the increase reflects the interaction
of new technologies and the economic incentives
to exploit previously untapped and uneconomic
resources. An example is the Fayetteville shale
formation in Arkansas. Development of this
resource requires horizontal drilling techniques
and fracturing of the shale formations to release
natural gas.
A second type of investment currently under-
way is the construction of electricity generating
facilities with lower emissions. Major construc-
tion activities are underway in Kentucky and
Illinois. These projects will utilize local coal
resources that have been underutilized in recent
years because of the availability of cheap, lower
sulfur western coal. Major investments in coal
generating plants have also been announced for
Texas. In the longer run, “clean coal” technology
in which coal is first converted to gas before
burning may be introduced on a large scale.
Finally, there is a tremendous amount of
investment activity in the area of alternative, non-
fossil, fuels. These include numerous installa-
tions to produce ethanol from corn and factories
to produce biodiesel fuels. Auto manufacturers
are investing in new engine “flexfuel” technolo-
gies that will allow motor vehicles to run on dif-
ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
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Crude Oil and Natural Gas Rotary Rigs in Operationferent mixtures of fossil and non-fossil fuels. It
remains to be seen whether these technologies
will prove economically viable.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Energy is an essential good, along with food,
water, medical care and a number of other goods.
However, the importance of recent energy develop-
ments is less than their high visibility leads many
to believe. There are certainly strains from the
high price of energy; however, there is no energy
crisis, and households and firms are adjusting in
a sensible way to price increases.
World energy demands are likely to continue
to grow rapidly, as economic growth in China and
India has developed substantial momentum. We
should hope that growth will take hold in Africa
and in Middle Eastern countries. If it does, rapid
economic development in those areas will add
further to growth in world energy demand.
Whether higher growth in the world economy
will continue to push energy prices up will
depend on developments in energy supply. There
are many promising technologies that in time
could make important contributions to energy
supplies. Moreover, technology can be of enor-
mous assistance in tempering growth in demand.
To harness this technology, we need to rely pri-
marily on market forces. Market adjustments have
been the hero in preventing energy price increases
over the past four years from disrupting economic
growth, as happened in the 1970s. In my judgment,
markets will continue to handle energy problems
well, and the future for the U.S. economy is bright.
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